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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\L-\.LKETI BA~K AND TRUST
CO.JIPAXY, a corporation, Administrator of the Estates of MINXETTA \YALKER, aka Nettie
Walker, deceased, and ILA MIN~ E T T A
\\' ALKER, deceased,
.JOH~ .:\. WALKER, deceased,
and R. K \VALKER, ROMA
\\'ALKER GROCK and ALTA
FAY \\' ALKER LAKE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
and
J. B. \VALKER,
Involuntary Plaintiff,
-vs.-

Case No.
10374

.\D-lTIX WALKER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by \Valker Bank and Trust Company al'i Administrator of the Estates of Minnetta Walker
and Ila .Jiinnetta \Valker and others against Austin
Walker, Appellant herein, seeking to have certain conwyances of real property made to Appellant by Min1

------1111
netta \ValkPr (l\lother of Appellant) and Ila 'I'
.
~1 Innetta
\Valker (Sister of Ap1wllant) set asi<lP and 1.,
.
.
,•q nesting
the Court to vest the h•gal t1tlPs therPin in Plaint'f'f, ·
I ~ a~
their interPsts may appear. Appt>llant ass<>rtPd that as
to the pro1wrty d(:'ed(•d to him from his motli"r h,
.
' ~ wa.~
the own(:'r tht>reof but that in the altPrnatiw if the Court
adjudged Appellant was not the ownpr hP wal' entitlPrl
to a lien t11(:'reon for his serviees and cost:-; ('Xpended 1 ~
connection with the property and his motlwr ov . . r th~
years. As to the property d<•(•d(:>d from his sistPr Appellant clai1m·d that he had rect>ived the propPrty in trmt
for certain specific purposPs which had been fulfillPd.

DISPOSITION IX THE LO\rER COL"RT
The matter \\·as tried to the Court without a jur:-.
following which the Court entered judgmPnt divesting
Appellant of title to any of the property transferred to
him by his mother or sish r and requiring him to account
for and turn over to \ValkPr Bank & Trust Company aU
such property, real or personal, as he may haYC receiwd
from his sister, including any interest dividends or other
returns thereon, provided Appellant should have a lien
on any property received from his sister for expenditures
made by him for which the Court shall det(:'rmine he is
entitled to reimbursement.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This being an equitable proceeding, Appellant seeks
by this Appeal to have the SuprPme Court review t~e
evidence and determine that the trial court erred in
2

holding that a confidential relationship existed between
.-\ppellant and his mother and that Appellant exercised
nJl(ltw in fhwn('\' upon his mother in connection with the
i·xi·cntion arnl dPliwry by her of the Deeds on the propt·r1Y ill qU\·stion. Ap1wllant further contends that the
rrial <·ourt nrPd in rpfusing to allow Appellant or his
\nf1· to tt·stify "·ith r!'s1wct to any claimed undue influeJH'\'. l 11 th1· alt\•rnatw Appellant claims that he should
),.. Pnt it l1·d to hP reimbursed for the monies expended by
liin1. l'nr tax<'s and other costs incident to operation of
1lw 11ro1H'rt~· and for hi:; services rendered thereon and
fnr hi;-; n1otl11·r, for which he is entitled to a lien on the
pr111wrt~·.

\Yith rPsJJed to the property acquired from his
sistPr thP Lower Court <>rred in holding there was a confidential rP!ationship between the parties since Appellant l1a;-; alway;; eonePdPd that hf> received such property
in trust for C\Ttain purposes which are undispute~ by
t!1t· partiPs an<l in eonnection there>vith the Court should
liaw permittPd him to make an accounting in which he
would l'P('PiYP ('rPdit for his costs and expenses incurred
as \\·ell as reasonahlP compensation for his services.
Finally, Ap1wllant contends that the trial court erred
in n•fnsing to grant Appellant a new trial on the ground
,,f 11\'\\·]~· discovPrPd f>vidence.

STATE~IENT

1011

OF FACTS

At the time of the pretrial this case and a compancase in which the plaintiffs are the same as here
3

and J. B. \Valker is named as defendant being
.
'
case no.
139,265 recently decided on appeal bv this cou t
.
.
·
r ' Wer.
consolidated for
. trial (R. 15(a) ). Even though consoh..·
dated, the eVIdence was heard separately in each case
The J. B. Walker case was tried first; and thereafte,
at the trial of the instant matter and evidence in tha:
case insofar as applicable was deemed evidence in thi~
case. References to the transcript in the J. B. Walker
case will be by page number following the designation
"JB\V." Reference to the transcript in this case will \ii:
by page number following the designation ''R."
Plaintiffs seek to have the court set aside two deedi
obtained by the defendant from his mother upon the
ground of incompetency of the grantor (Tr. 16a). The;
also seek relief with respect to transfers to defendant
of property from his sister Ila.
The defendant Austin \Valker is the youngest son of
John A. and :Minnetta Walker. He has two brothers, J.
B. \Valker and R. E. \V alker, who are the two eldest children of the family. There were three sisters, Faye, Ila
and Roma ( JBW 210, 211). The father died in 1912
(JB\V 211); Ila died on February 23, 1955 (R. 114):
the mother died in November 1959 (R. 115). The family
grew up on a farm of approximately 40 acres in the
vicinity of Union in Salt Lake County, Utah (JBW 2121
J.B.,- R. E., and Faye were married in the 1920s. R. E.
•
. 'fe
moved away when he got married; J. B. and his Wl
remained in the home until 1931 when they moved away
(JBW 211, 212). Faye and her husband moved to Ne·
vada · Ila never married. She lived in the family home

'

4

all of hPr life until 1952 (R. 145). Roma lived in the
family home f'XC'Ppt for periods when she worked in
California and X evada. She returned to the family home
in 19;"i-t an<l has been there ever since. (R. 249). Minnetta
\\'alhr, the mother, lived in the family home until her
dPath. l'Xt:PJ>t for a year in 1952 and 1953 when she
; 1 as with Faye in ~evada (R. 352).
Austin married in
19:r~ ( R 1-t2) and t•ver since then, except for two or
thrP(' years, has lived with his family within approximatPly a block of the family home (R. 450).
Prior to 1920, J. B. and R. E. engaged in the trucking business and from then on did no farming (R. 143).

From approximately 1920 until the present time Austin
had practically the sole responsibility for the operation
of the farm (R. 1-!2). There were two or three years
when his mother rented the farm but the lessees failed
to 1wrforrn and it became Austin's responsibility to salYagP as much of the crop as possible (R. 289).
approximately 1947 there were horses and
cows on the farm and chickens at various times (R. 418).
~lo:,;t of the crops produced on the place were used to
f Ped tlw livestock and were used by the family (R. 288).
Prior to about 19~0, the family operated a mercantile
~tore. However the store was closed in the early 1920s
(JBW :.239) and thereafter the only source of income of
.\!other Walker was from the sale of dairy and poultry
products ( R. 230) produced on the farm.
l~ntil

The farm consisted of three tracts of land -

viz., a
tract of approximately 11 acres shown in pink on Ex5

hi bit 3; a tract shown in orange on Exhibit 3 con.- ,t·
SI~ illg
of approximately 19 acrt•s; and a tract known as ti
" cree k property " but not shown on Exhibit 3 con~· ,t· It
'

clS ill·•

of approximately 10 acres. In addition there are tli:
lots shown on Exhibit 3 East of the pink tract wheri:
the \Y alker home, outbuildings and store \\'PrP located.

On Octobt>r 8, 195-1, :\linnetta \Yalhr, the muther.
executed and dt>liven•d to Austin two dPeds which arf
Exhibits P-4 and P-G. Exhibit P--1 descrilws the prr11 ,
erty known as the "creek prorwrty"; Exhibit P-6 d~
scribes the property shown in pink. These deeds were
executed by Austin's mother at a bank in Midvale, rtaL
in the presence of Dale \V aters, Vice President and jfan.
ager of the bank, who then and there notarized her sig.
nature ( R. 317, 318). At the time of the execution of said
deeds she remarked, in his presence, that she was glad
she could do this in return for what Austin had done
for her and that Austin had more than paid for the
property (R. 400, 40G). From the time of their execution until they were recorded on November 25, 193~1.
said deeds were in the possession and control of _\ustin
(R. 398).
In the late 1930s a compromise for delirn1uent taxei
on the \Valkt>r property for several prior years W(J.I
effected for the sum of $844.44 (JB\V 300). Austin paid
this sum bv his check dated December 26, 1939, Exhibit
49 in Case. 139,265 (R. 407, 408). Austin also paid ta:M
o; the \V alker property for the yt>ars 1925, 1926, 192!1
a nd 1931 totallinO" $438.12. Exhibit D-11. Austin alio
'
b
~
paid taxes on the vValker property for the years 1
9
·
to 1962 inclusive totallmg
$3,320.07, Exh1·b·it Dl
- •· All
6

ahon mmtioned were paid with funds of Austin
during- the 1930s Austin's mother gave him money
to pa.\ taxi's for th l'<'e or four years ( R. 444). Taxes on
t!H· trad slimrn in pink and the "creek property" which
,, ('/'(' (·om·p:-Pd to Austin by his mother are included
ill the amo1111ts paid for the years above set forth (R.
-W7). :\ ust m had exclusive possession of the property
acquired from his mother from the year 1947 until the
Jll't'H'nt tilllP. (R. 4:21).
ta'.\PS

t''.\('Ppt

1n DPc<•mher 195-t-, Ila Walker, a sister of Austin,
\ms in a hospital at which time she caused her property
to lw transft·rn·d to Austin (R. 321). Included in the

prorwrty so transferred was a 3 acre tract, shown on
Exhibit ;3 as the property in brown, which was transf Prred hy quit claim deed, being Exhibit P-5. Appellant
Jia" ahrnys agret'd that he received the property from
Ila for the purpose of paying her debts and funeral expPnsPs and for paying for the support and maintenance
of h;s 1110thPr until her death and then for her expenses
of last illnPss and funeral expenses (R. 427). He offered
at t!te timf' of thP trial to account for the property ree1·iHd from Ila: hut the court refused to permit him
to do so ( H. -t:~7).
The trial court found there was a confidential relationship lwtwt'en defendant and his mother and also behrP<>n dt'frndant and his sister Ila (R. 47, 48). The trial
court ht>ld thP dt'eds from defendant's mother to be null
and void on the ground of undue influence exercised by
the dt'frndant upon her (R. 47). The court ordered defendant to a('count for all the property transferred to
7

him from his sister Ila and, except such as the eou
"shall determine he is entitled to by way of reiinburs~
ment out of the assets of the trust," ordered him t d
0 ~
liver the same to the administrator of the estate of hi~
sister (R. 44).
'
The defendant claims the deeds from his mother arP
valid or, in the alternative if he is deprived of the property, that he should be entitled to a lien thereon for the
amount of taxes paid, improvements made and service~
rendered (R. 6, 7). Defendant acknowledged the trust
with respect to the Ila property and offered to account
for the same as stated above, and claimed compensation
for his services as trustee ( R. 19). Appeal is taken from
the orders of the trial court denying defendant any of
the relief claimed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO CONFIDENTIAL RELA·TIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
HIS MOTHER; AND THE DEEDS WERE
NOT PROCURED BY UNDUE INFLUENCE
UPON HER.
The Court made a finding that a confidential relationship existed between Appellant and his mother and
that the Deeds were procured by Appellant by the ex·
ercise of undue influence upon her but did not find any
facts upon which the confidential relationship would
rest. However, undue influence was not an issue in the
case. The Pre-trial Order lists the contentions of the
Respondents as follows:

8

( 1) Defendant acquired certain property from his

:-istrr on an exprPss trust (R-16). (This was always the
Jlo:-;ition taken hy Defendant.)
( 2) If the property was not taken on an express

tru:-;t. the transft->r to Defendant from his sister was
\(lidablP lweaust-> of "the incompetency of Ila Walker at

tl!P ti11H-' of the execution of the instruments by which
t!w rnrious transfers were effected." (R-16A)

\ ::! ) Tlw transfers of certain properties to Defendan: from his mother "are void by reason of the incompPtf::'ncy of the grantor." (R-16A)

DefPndan t has admitted and declared he "held
tl10sr propPrtiPs acquired from his mother in trust for
thl' Plaintiffa and generally for the heirs of Minnetta
\falkPr." (R-16A.)
( -1-)

Xor did the Pre-trial Order frame an issue as to any
"confidential'' relationship between Appellant and his
1nother or sister.
At tlw lwg'inning of the trial, Counsel for Respondents in his opening statement made the following referPnce concerning qndue influence and confidetial relationship:
"It will further be our contention that if
Minnetta Walker was technically competent at
the time she executed these instruments, she nevrrthf'less did so under undue influence from the
defendant, Austin ·walker. Our evidence of undue influence will be simply the close family tie
between the defendant and the donor, the fact
that he lived in such close proximity to her, that
he saw her quite frequently. His chicken coop
was right next to her house. I say he saw her

9

f!·eqlH'_ntly; and if ~hPrP was a ('<>nfidential rP]a.
t10nslup lwtwPPn tl11s rnotlu•r and any of he .
.
l
.
.
r ~on,
1t wa:::; wtwePn ~Lmndta and the def<·ndant.'' ··
This :::;tatPment explain:::; why tlw n•(·ord allJ>ea .
r~ ttJ
be totallY lacking in <·ither anv PvidPnee of a eonf'i"d ·
·
·
f·nt1a1
relatiom~hip behn.•en Defondant his motlwr or of am
facts indieating the exerci~H.• of unduP inflm•nce upon h\'.r
by Defendant.
Although Respond< nts admitted at the outset tha:
their claim of undue influence rests upon tht' "c·lo~P
family tie betwePn the dPfon<lant and the donor," the
law is well settlPd that family relationship alone is n11t
sufficient to establish "confidt>ntial relationship'' or "u..~
due influence." In Hatch v. llatch, -!-() U.218, 1-18 P. -±33,
where the Court was concPrne<l with a convenyance from
a father to his son, the Court held:
1

"In nearly all, if not all, of the foregoing
cases (excepting those cited from L'tah) the 11uP~·
tion of what constitutes a fiduciary relation or
one of such trust and confidence as ordinarily will
cast the burden of proof on the beneficiary of a
particular transaction is fully discussed. It ts
made very clear that under circumstances !ikP
those in the case at bar there is no such fiduciary
relation of trust and confidence as will cast the
burden of proof upon the beneficiary under a deed
or a will. The relation of parent and child or hu"·
band and wife does not, in and of itsflf, create
any such presumption." (Emphasis added)
Again, in the case of Froyd 1/. Barnhurst, 83 C 2il,
28 P. 2d. 135, the Court made the following comments.
"Appellants apparently place the burden of
their argument upon the proposition that then:

10

"a~ a l'onfidrntial relationship existing between
,\,ot'endant and IH•r lllother, ~lrs. 8andin, and
th•·n·fon· this ease is controlled by the rule that
\\ lwn• slwh eonfidPntial relationship exists be:
t\\t>1•n g-rantor and grantee, the burden is upon
thl' .~rantee to show the transaction to be fair
and f n·e from fraud and undue influence. Appellant ('it1·s Peter:-;on v. Bitdge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P.
:21 l; JJirdsl'll I'. Leai:itt, 32 Ctah 136, 89 P. 397;
/'uf1111d 1·. Corl'.IJ, () l'tah 3~2, 2-1 P. 190; Omega.
f 11 r1sf11/l'lif Co. L Woolley, '72 Utah -17-1, 271 P.
l!ll; also Paddock r. Pulsifer, -13 Kan. 718, 23 P.
104-!)' 1051.
.. J)pf t'ndants do not complain of the rule
stat('d and follow1:1d in these cases, but contend
tl1<·,· han· no application to the case at bar. In
0!11.,,r words, tlwy contend the facts here do not
1m·s1·11t a <'USI:' of fiduciary or confidential relationship. Here the claim of fiduciary relationship is based upon the following evidence in addition to the fact of the parties being mother and
dau1-d1tc>r: The mother was old and feeble, could
iwt read or write the English language; she lived
with the daughter, who at one time tried to collect
a note belonging to her mother without success.
For a time they had the mother's money in a
joint ha11k account in the name of both the mother
and daughter, a11d the daughter at times collected the rent due to her mother.
"This court is committed to the doctrine that
tlie mer<' relationship of parent and child does not
co 11 sf it11 t e evidence of such confidential relationsl1 i pas to create a prPsnmption of fraud or wndue
i11tfocncl'. Hatch r. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P.
-1-:33, -137; Furlong V. Tilley, 51 utah 617, 172 P.
fil(i." (Emphasis added)

51 e. 617, 172 P. 676; Amado
r.• lt;11irn" !i:l Ariz. :213, lGl P. 2d. 117; Salvner v. Salv-

~!'\, al~o, F11rlo11.fJ I.'. Tilley,

11

ner, 349 Mich. 375, 8-! N.,V. 2d 871, Binder i:. Bindit
50 U. 2d 142, 309 P. 2d 1050.
This Court has been required on several occasion,
to reverse the trial court on the matter of undue influence
See, Chadd v. Moser, 25 U. 369, 71 P. 870; Stringfell-Ou
v. Hanson, 25 U. 480, 71 P. 1052; In re Lavelle's Esfot'.
122 U. 253, 248 P. 2d 372; Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Cle
341, 325 P. 2d 839.
In the Richmond Case this Court quoted \11\L
approval form the earlier case of Anderson 1.:. Thomn.'
108 U. 252, 159 P. 2d 142. There the evidence relied on
by the Plaintiff to set aside the conveyance included th"
following facts:
" ( 1) The transfer to the Defendant son was
without consideration (other than love and affection);
(2) The Grantor (mother) was 86 years old:

( 3) She was failing in health and almost
totally blind ;
( 4) At time of the transfer she was grieving
over the loss of another son;
( 5) Court found that, under the ~irc~
stances, the Grantor could have been easily !Ill·
posed upon;
( 6) The Grantee (son) lived in same home
with the Gran tor;
(7) The Grantee received "substantially all'
of Grantor's property a few months before Grantor's death;
(8) The tr an sfer to Grantee in effect disin·
herited six other children;
12

''This Court, in an opinion by Justice Wolfe
affi.rmed the . D~strict Court's decision refusin~
to fmd undue mfluence on the above facts, stating:
'However, these circumstances alone are
not sufficient to show undue influence. The
Plaintiff must do more than merely raise a
suspicion. There must be some affirmative
evidence to show that Richard did exercise
a dominating influence over this mother and
thm; induced her to part with her property.
Such affirmative evidence is almost totally
lacking here.'
"The Court observed that 'no one testified
to anything that would indicate that Richard was
bringing pressure to bear on his mother to effect
the transfer of this property to him.' "
finding of undue influence cannot rest upon mere
suspicion, nor will it be presumed from mere interest
or opportunity.
"\\'e are aware that ••••undue influence is seldom suhjeet to direct proof, but, as a general
rule, must be established by inferences and circumstancps •••';but it must also be kept in mind
that ... "'it likewise is true that a finding of undue
influence cannot rest upon more suspicion. There
must be some substantial facts upon which the
inferences and deductions are based, and the cireumstanees reli<>d on should clearly point out
tlu-- 1wrson who it is alleged exercised the undue
influencl• and his acts constituting the alleged
undue influence." (Emphasis added.) In re Lay elh.>'s Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372, 378.
~\.

"•••undue influence must be proved. It will

1wt be presumed from mere interest or opportun-

ity. The opportunity to exercise influence, unless
romlJined u·ith circumstances ten.ding to show its
exercise a/fords no presumption that it was in

13

f ?.ct exercised." ( E~rnphasis added.) He Brv ',
Estate 82 l 1 tah 390, 25 P. :2d (ilO.
.an"
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, .... U. 2nd.... , 401P.2d ilO ·
• lb
the most recent case of which we are aware in which
this Court has discussed confidential rPlationship and
undue influence. In that case the Court reversed thf
trial court and found there was not a confidential relationship and that a finding of undue inflm•nee could
not be sustained. In discm;sing th<-,se qut>stion~, tlw
Court stated on page 713 of 401 Pacific 2nd:

"The first question to be resolved is whether
the lower court erred in its determination that
a confidential relationship existed between the
parties as that term is considered in its legal
significance. The evidence is undisputed that
there existed anwng the parties sincere aff ectio11,
trust and confidence, but is that legally sufficient
to constitute a confidential relationship giving
rise to a presumption that the transaction 1i·a"
unfair? We think not.
"The mere relationship of parent and child
does not constitute evidence of such confidential
relationship as to create a presumption of fraud
or undue influence. While kinship may be a factor
in determining the existence of a legally significant confidential relationship, there must be a
showing in addition to the kinship, a reposal of
confidence by one party and the resulting superiority and influence on the other party. T~e
relationship must be such as would lead an ordi~
arily prudent person in the management of his
busmess affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the other party which largely results
in the substitution of the will of the latter t,or
that of the former in the material ~iatters '""
valved in the transaction. The doctrme of con·
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fidential relationship rests upon the principle of
iuequality between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties
owr the other. Mere confidence in one person
/Ji/ n11othrr is not sufficient alone to constitute
s11cli n relationship. The confidence must be reposed by one under such circumstances as to
cr<'ate a corresponding duty, either legal or moral,
upon the vart of the other to observe the con/idcnce, and it must result in a situation where
~'" a matter of fact there is superior influence on
11111' side and dependence on the other." (emphasis
ours)
ThP tonrt, in Bradbury vs. Rasmussen, supra, also

h\'ld that undue influence must be proved by clear and
1·om'mcmg evidPncP. TlH' record in the instant case
is lacking in proof of undue influence by clear and
convincing evidence. lnfact, it is wholly devoid of any
t>vi<lPn('P of undue influence. It is not even susceptible
of a snspieion of undue influence. At most, Respondents
han~ done no more than show an opportunity. This is
not enough.
Although handicapped by the court's ruling on the
applitation of the ''dead man's statute," defendant's evidPnee is elPar and positive and refutes even a suggestion
of undue influence. The execution of the deeds by Mother
\\' alker was not a ''bedroom" transaction nor a "death
bed" episode. The deeds were executed more than four
years prior to her death in a bank in Midvale, Utah,
before a vice president and manager of the bank and
were notarized by him (R. 317). Although Mr. Waters,
the bank officer, could not remember the conversation,
he remembered the incident and testified there was noth-
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ing unusual about the transaction that attracted his
attention (R. 318). Had defendant attempted to impose
his will upon his mother to such an extent as to result
in the substitution of his will for hers, it is quite unlikeh·
that such would have escaped the observation of ~1;.
'Vaters. Defendant testified that his mother stated in thP
presence of Mr. 'V ate rs that she was happy she could
do this (execute the deeds) in return for what dt>fendant
had done for her (R. 400). She also stated at that
time that defendant had more than paid for the property
(R. 406).
Undue influence is refuted by the evidence of J. B.
Walker. He testified that the mother told him that sh~
was going to see that Austin got the property (R. 349)
and that it was her intention that Austin have the
property because of the care that lw and his family
had given ( R. 351).
After the deeds had been made over to Austin, she
told J. B. that she had done so ( R. 355). If Austin had
used undue influence to get the deeds, it is quite unlikely
that Mother \Valker would have told J. B. some nine
years prior thereto of her intention to deed the properry·
to him, and, after the deeds were made, advise J.B. that
she had done so.
Mother Walker was able to resist the persuasion
of others for she told J.B. that she had come home
from Nevada in order to avoid the pressure which was
put upon her by the folks in K evada to dred her property
to them (R. 353). This circumstance might be a clue to
this case for it is a common trait of human nature for
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a person to aecuse another of the evil which he himself
possesses. lf plaintiffs attempted to persuade Mother
\\'alker to convey her property to them, it is not surprising that tlH'Y should accuse Austin of the same evil
doings. lf tlierP is a suspicion of evil doing by Austin,
it is in tlH' minds of the plantiffs and not in the evidence.
At the close of the evidence the trial court gave
l1is irnpression tlwn•of. Among other things he stated,

"I think truth hasn't been rampant around
ht•re. Let me put it that way first. I think there
has Leen somebody's conscience seared a lot here,
but it doesn't seem to faze them much, and so I
have to pick what I think is the truth." (R. 480,
±81)
"I believe J.B. has done a lot for this family."

(R. -!81)

''I think that Austin Walker was young
enough to kind of get caught in the snare and
stay home, and the fell ow that stays home generally has the rough end of keeping things together." (R. 481)

"I think the testimony of a man who teaches
school, who's been a bishop in his church, should
be given a little more weight than the other witnesses have where his testimony is competent..
I would be inclined to think that maybe he may
be telling me the truth here in places." (R. 481,
482).
"The testimony of J.B.'s wife, Mary or Marilyn - I have forgotten her name - something
like that - and J.B. leads me to believe that
Mother just wasn't being imposed on here insofar
as that property is concerned, and I would think
the property in pink ought to go to Austin as
his own." (R. 482)
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Th: latt•r findings of confidential rPlatiomship and
undue mfluPnCP arP obviouslY• n•1rn<TJ1ant
a 11 u-1 con
t ra.
•
I'°'
dictorv
to the Court's own Pvalnation of thP ''"·i·d
•
. l'Il('~.
Although tlw Court made no finding [!S to th 1, ark.
quacy of consi<h•ration in thP transfers from ~finn1>tta
w·alker to hee SOn, tlwn• can hP no qUPStion that theri·
is suffieient consideration hy !'Pason of Ap1wllant'~ earing for the property and his Sl'tTices to his motlwr owr
the years.
In the case of Randall 1:. Tracy Cullins Tm.st Company, G r. 2d 18, 305 P. 2d -1-80, tlw court was concerned
with a situation wlwn~ the Plaintiff lt>ft his lmsines:; and
home in Ogden and moved to Provo, lTtah, which to.
gether with services rPndt~red for tht> decendPnt was held
to be adequate consideration for an agrepnwnt to eonwy
real property.
In the case of Gil1lJ011s v. Brimm, 119 F. G21, 230 P.
2d 983, an action was brought to spt aside a conveyanc~
of property to the DPfendant which was made in return
for Defendant's promisP to provide Plaintiff with a home,
support and care upon the ground that Plaintiff was so
infirm of body and mind "that her will was overcome to
the extent that the execution and delivery of the documents were not her voluntary acts." The Defendant
grantee in that case was a niece ·who had been the objl'ft
of special affection from the Plaintiff. The Grantor w~
75 years of age, in ill health, and desired to have the Df·
fendant come to live with her, care for her and run th~
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farm. Comuu•nts of the Court are particularly pertinent
to the facts in the instant matter, which we quote:
"The plaintiff apparently set out to make two
lllain contentions in seeking to avoid the effects of
tht• dl·Pd, bill of sale and assignment. (1) That
shP was so infirm of body and mind that her will
\rns oYPf<'OllH' to the extent that the execution and
dPlivery of the documents were not her voluntary
ads; and ( :2) that the defendants breached the
agrel'lllPnt to provide her a home and care, \Vhich
Pntitles her to rescission. The burden of proving
th<'~W contentions was upon the plaintiff."

··Without delint>ating them, we observe that the
('YidPm·e reveals some discrepancies in plaintiff's
tPstimony concerning the ownership and disposition of pt>rsonal property which may have given
rise to some skepticism on the part of the trial
eourt with respect to plaintiff's frankness, or perhaps better stated, her lack of memory and understanding of details due to her infirmity and advanct>d age.
''The plaintiff made some effort in the evidt•nee to support her first point that the execution
of the conveyances were not voluntary. The se<tUPnce of events themselves, without more, would
bP sufficient refutation of this contention. But
takPn together with other evidence there is ample
to warrant the court in refusing to believe that
plaintiff had met her burden of proof that she did
not intend the coveyances."
8eP abo: Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon Inc.,
11 U. 2d 166, 356 P. 2d 286.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN IT8 RCLING ON
THE "DEAD MAX'S STATUTE'' BY PRECL"CDING DEFE~DANT AND HIS WIFE
FROM TESTIFYING \VITH RESPECT TO
MATTERS PERTAINING TO lTNDUE I~
FLUENCE.
Under Point I it was urged that thc> evidence doe~
not support the finding of undue influencf>. Althoui;h
not admitting the sufficiency of tht~ evidence, it is thP
contention of defendant that by offering evidence of
undue influPnce plaintiffs waived the incompetency created by the "dead man's statute" with respcet therPto.
The rule adopted by this court is that ''under 'dead man's
statute' (Sec. 78-24-2 U.C.A. 1953) a witness whose interest is adverse to that of the estate of deceased may
testify concerning matters equally within knowledge of
deceased and witness, where representative has put in
testimony as to those matters"" 0 . " Burk v. Peter 113
Utah 58, 202 P. 2d 543, Startin v. Madsen 120 F 631,
237 p. 2d 834.
Defendant offered to testify to conversations with
his mother concerning her motive in making the deeds but
was prevented from doing so by the ruling of the court
on the "dead man's statute" (R. 404, 405, 406.) De·
fendant offered a schedule, Exhibit D-13, showing crops
he had produced on the farm year by year for a period
of over 20 years (R. 409). The court refused to admit
the exhibit (R. 412). Defendant also offered to testi~·
to improvements he had made on the farm over the
years (R. 415) but was not permitted to do so by the
20

ruling of the court on the dead man's statute (R. 416) .
.\lotivP of tlw mother in making the deeds, crops produced by defendant on property in question, and imprownwnts made thereon by defendant, tend to refute
nn<ltw influPn<'(:'. The court erred in failing to admit
~urh evjdence.

POINT III
TUE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
A COXFIDK~'"'l'IAL RELATIONSHIP EX-

ISTED BET,VEEN DEFENDANT AND HIS
SISTJ.~R ILA AND IN DENYING COMPENSATIOX TO DEFENDANT FOR HIS SERVICES AS TRVSTEE.
Tlw court found defendant had received property

from his sister Ila upon an oral trust (R. 48) and
ordered him to account therefor. (R. 43). The court
also found there was a confidential relationship between
drf Pndant and his sister (R. 48).
l<\Jr the same reasons as set forth in Point I, it

is urged that the evidence does not support the finding
of a confidential relationship between defendant and his
sister Ila. Had defendant attempted to impose upon
his sister or take advantage of her why should he admit
lw held the property in trust. Defendant acknowledged
thP trust in his answer (R. 8). His position was stated
in the pretrial order (R. 17). Defendant claims to have
ust><l funds of his own to defray the expenses for which
thr property of his sister was to be used and that the
expenses which he paid exceeded in value the property
rrri\'"t>d from Ila (R. 9). Defendant has never claimed
as his own the residue of the property, if any, after
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the e~penses were paid. It may he urgPd that defendant
was m error in using his own funds for payment of
expenses and attempting to off:,wt sueh against the valu~
of the Ila property. If it is propc>r that he should account
for the Ila propPrty arnl lw rPimhurs<><l for moneys advanced from his own funds, the fad n•rnains that he
does not and nevPr has clairn<>d tlw n•sidue, if any. a~
his property.

The facts, as al)Ove sc>t forth, should refute th,,
finding of confidf~ntial relationship. Even more signifi. '
cant than the lack of evidence to support tlw findin!!
is the lack of necessity for the finding at all. Had
defendant denied the trust plaintiffs would have hPen
justified in attempting to prove confidPntial relationship.
Admission of the trust hv
. the def Pndant obviatPd anY.
necessity for the finding of confidt>ntial relationship.
Inasmuch as the finding of confidential relationship i~
unnecessary to support the trust it appears the only
purpose therefor is an attempt to justify disallowanc~
of compensation to defendant for his services in carin~ ,
for the property of his sister. If an accounting show~
disposition of the prorwrty in accordance with the tru8t.
the claim of the defendant, as set forth in thP pretrial ,
order ( R. 19) for the compensation for his servicPs, IL\
trustee, is well founded.

POIXT IV
·THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT ALTERNATIVE RELIEF BY
\VAY OF A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY
ACQUIRED FROM HIS MOTHER FOR IMPROVEMENTS AND TAXES PAID.
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If tlw <·ourt <k•tennines that the deeds from defrndan t '~ motlwr WPre not obtained by undue influence,
1lt>frndant 's elaim of a lien by way of alternative relief
ht•collll'S moot. In any evPnt, discussion here should
not lw <·onstnwd by way of detraction from the firm
<·on\·idion of <lPfl:'ndant that the finding of undue inf!m·rn·e should be rPversed.
Till• maxim, "He who seeks equity must to equity"
ltas long IH•Pn recognizPd by this court. See Commercial
!Ja11k r. I' age and Bri1iton, 45 Utah 14, 142 P. 709;
lla11r·ock 1·. Luke, 52 rtah 142, 173 P. 137; Rosenthyne v.
J!attl1ew-J/c( 'ullough, 51 l'Ttah 38, 168 P. 957; Glenn
1. Play<'r, 7 Ctah 2d -128, 326 P. 2d 717.

Plaintiffs have been content to sit by and allow
<!t·frndant to takP care of the farm for over forty years,
pay taxes then•on and improve the same and make
the produce tlwrefrom available for members of the
family who were at home and, particularly, to provide
for an income for the mother. But when the economic
C'omplexion of the property changed from a farm value
nf some $:200.00 per acre to a subdivision value of $5,000.00 an acre, plaintiffs suddenly become interested
and seek the equitable power of the court to deprive defendant of his title thereto. (J.B.W. 295-298)
The property was saved from tax sale by defendant.
Dt>tail as to the taxes paid by defendant is set forth
in tlw Statement of Facts. Defendant farmed the propPrty for some -10 years for the benefit of the family (R.
1-J.:2, 288, 289 and 230). Plaintiffs will probably contend
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that the farming operation was of economic benefit to
defendant. This appears to he a fallacy in view of th"
fact that there were some years when ~[other Walker
rented the property on shares but the lessees apparentlv
did not think it worthwhile to continue through the ve
. ar·
so they walked away and left Austin to salvage such
crop as ht> could for the benefit of the family. (R. 289i.
The fact is that defendant operated tht> farm for thl:'
benefit of the family.
If deft>ndant is to be deprived of the property, tlw
court should avoid unjust enrichment to plaintiffs and
invoke the e<1uitable maxim referred to above by charging the property with a lien in favor of defendant for
ta..xes paid and services rendered by him.

POINTY
THE COURT ERRI~D IN DEXYIXG DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial upon tht
grounds, among other things, of newly discovered endence (R. 50). Affidavits of defendant, Glenn C. Schmid!
and Ray Smith were filed in support thereof (R. 52-57).
The affidavit of Ray Smith states that he had been
acquainted with Minnetta Walker for some years prior
· to her death; that in approximately the year l 948 hP
had conversations with Minnetta \Valker with respect
to purchasing an acre of ground, at which time she
stated she would sell an acre of ground to him but that
she intended to convey the remainder of her property
to her son, Austin \Valker, for the purpose of compen·
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him for st>rv1ces performed and improvements
made on ht>r property. In his affidavit Glenn C. Schmidt
;-;tat\'~ that lw i8 a real estate broker residing in Salt
LakP County, l~tah; that in approximately the years 1948
and 19-t~ lH• approached Minnetta \V alker for the purpo,.w of purchasing a building lot from her, at which
tiuw ~ht• advised him that she was negotiating with Ray
~mith for the Hale of an acre of ground and that she
intPnd~ to keep the remainder of her property for the
pnrpos<' of convt>ying the same to her son, Austin Walker,
and that she wanted to reserve it for her son, Austin,
to iwrmit him to place a supermarket on the property
if he so desired. The affidavit of Austin Walker states
that sine!:' the trial of the cause he talked with Rex Cole
on tlw telephone who advised defendant that in about
tlw year 1950 he had had conversations with Minnetta
\Y alker in which she had told him that she intended
to give her property to her son Austin for the reason
that he had made improvements thereon and had performed services for her and her family.
~ating

To warrant granting a new trial on newly discovered
eYi<lence this court, in the very recent case of Universal
lnastment Co. i:. Carpets, Incorporated,·----·-- Utah ........,
+OO P. 2d 564, 567, has stated that the moving party
must meet these requirements:
''there must be material, competent evidence which
is in fact 'newly discovered;' which by due dilig<'nce could not have been discovered and producPd at the trial; and it must not be merely
cumulative or incidental, but it must be of sufficifnt substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there would have been a different
result. ••• ,,
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In Jensen v. Logan City, 89 l'tah 3-17, 57 P. ~'l iOS
this court held the trial court had abused its discrf'tio~
in denying a motion for new trial hased upon nt•\ih
discoverPd evidence. Tlw court statPd on pagp 7~3: ·
"\YherP disintert>sted tPstimony on the Yitai
point in a easP is v<>ry s<'ant, newly <lis<·owr\•<l
te::-;fonony on that point ap1waring frolll affid1n-ib
in support of tlw motion for a nPw trial to he
appan,ntly n'liahlP, wh<'n it ap1wars that tlw
movant for the new trial was not guilty of
indiligence in failing to obtain the wi tnes; for
the trial, and that there is no element of
holding such witness in reserve for purposes
of obtaining a new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in slang phraseolo~y as
'an ace in the hole' - and it appears likel1
that such evidence would change tlw result, a nP,;.
trial should be granted. -While the granting or
refusing of thP motion lies in the sound <fowrl'tion
of the court, wherp there is graVl' suspicion that
justieP ma~· have miscarried becamw of tlw laek
of Pnlightllwnt on a vital point whiC'h nPw Pvi<l<->nC'e will apparently supply, and tlw othPr Plt>mPnts att<'ndant on obtaining a n('W trial on tlw
ground of 1w\\·ly disC'oYered <'vidPnCl' an' prt>:'Pnt.
it would hP an alnuw of sound discn,tion not to
grant th<-> same.***"
The foregoing rnk• is also followed in 8tate r. Dunca11.
10:2 rtah +l9, 13:2 P. 2d 12-1-.
The casP at bar meets the n><:1uirements set forth
above.
A vital point in this case is the court's finding of
undue inflrn'nCP. Howev<->r, as lH•rt>inabove pointed out,
undue influence was not framed as an issue in the pre·
trial Order. 'rlwn•fore, Ap1wllant could not have an·
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ticipah·d that it would later be the basis upon which
tlw trial <·ourt would set aside the transfers. The fact
that d(•frndant's mother, several years before the con'; ya1H·es ,,·pn• made, disclos<>d to three disinterested
!l!'J'Sl)Jl:' lt(•J' intent to convey her property to her son,
.\nstin. sl1ould hav<' a mat<>rial bearing upon the question
of uJ1dt1t• influ<'nc'l'. Such evidence is of sufficient sub~1a11"(' that \\·ith it tlwre is a reasonable likelihood that
11 11 • rt>:.:ult wuuld have been different.
Th(• l'Vid<>nc<> was newly discovered. In his affidavit,
<h·frndant stat<>s that he had no knowledge of such evide1we until after the trial. The evidence could not, by
dnP diligen<·t>, have been discovered and produced at the
trial sin<'e tht> mattPr was not an issue in the case. The
affidavit of defendant in support of the motion states
that ht• contacted Hay Smith in the summer of 1964
in pn•paration for the trial and was advised that Smith
liad 1wgotiat<>d ,,·ith defendant's mother for the purchase
of an acre of land, but defendant did not know until
aftPr tlw trial that his mother had stated to Smith that
:.:hP wanted him, the defendant, to have her property.
1.R. .)~). Tlw affidavit of Ray Smith states that he did
not inform defendant of such statement until January
1965. Defendant's affidavit states that he attempted to
lo('at1' RPx Cole in the summer of 1964. He made inquiry
of relative:.; of Rex Cole and attempted to correspond
with him hut was unable to locate him so that he might
hP a witness at the time of the trial (R. 53). Defendant
had no know ledge prior to January 1965, after the trial,
nf thP fart that Glenn Schmidt had negotiated with def Pndant's mother for purchase of land and that she had
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told him that she intended to keep the property. an d
give it to her son, Austin (R. 57).
The evidence is not merely cumulative but relat{'s
to a matter injected into the case at the trial without
defendant having had an opportunity to prepare to meet
such issue. Dale \Vaters, the bank officer, testified to thP
execution of the deeds but could not recall any of the
conversation (R. 318). Defendant and J. B. Walker
testified to statements made by their mother regarding
the conveyance of the property to defendant. It is difficult to justify the court's finding in light of such evidence unless he considered the interest of the witnessf',.
If such is true, the testimony of three disinterested persons is not cumulative and is vital to the issue.

CONCLUSION
The principal object of this appeal is to obtain a
reversal of the trial court's finding of undue influence.
The record shows the defendant operated the family
farm all of his adult life and lived in close proximity
of his mother and had almost daily contact with her.
If such circumstances provide opportunity for the exercise of undue influence, they fall far short of anythin~
suggesting actual domination and exertion of influence.
In view of the deficiency in the evidence, as expressed in Point I, it is a deplorable thing, aside from tht
economic consequences involved, for the court to have
branded a wholesome relationship of parent and child
with the stigma of a confidential relationship as such IB
known in the law. This court is therefore strongly urged
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to correct the error of the trial court and reverse the
finding of undue influence. It is hoped that such will
bP accomplished by this appeal.
wru;

It has bPen emphasized in Point III that not only
there lack of evidence to sustain the finding of a

r,onfidential relationship between defend ant and his sistt>r but there was no necessity for such finding at all.
Thi~ 1•rror should also be corrected. Defendant should be
n'quirt>d to account for his sister's property and should
lw allowed compensation for his services in the handling
thNeof.
The record is such that the errors of the trial court
lihould be corrected without the necessity of a new trial.
If for any reason the court is not of such an opinion,
it has been pointed out that ground for a new trial exists
and such should be granted. It is hoped that relief can
IJe afforded and justice done on behalf of defendant
without the rewashing of the family linen for a period
of some 40 years in a new trial. Finally, if all else fails,
defendant should not be deprived of relief. Equity requires that its principles be invoked by impressing the
proprrty with a lien in favor of defendant as suggested
in Point IV.
Respectfully submitted,
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